One of the most expected properties of a logical system is that it can be algebraizable, in the sense that an algebraic counterpart of the deductive machinery could be found. Since the inception of da Costa's paraconsistent calculi, an algebraic equivalent for such systems have been searched. It is known that these systems are non self-extensional (i.e., they do not satisfy the replacement property). More than this, they are not algebraizable in the sense of Blok-Pigozzi. The same negative results hold (...) for several systems of the hierarchy of paraconsistent logics known as Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs). Because of this, these logics are uniquely characterized by semantics of non-deterministic kind. This paper offers a solution for two open problems in the domain of paraconsistency, in particular connected to algebraization of LFIs, by obtaining several LFIs weaker than C1, each of one is algebraizable in the standard Lindenbaum-Tarski's sense by a suitable variety of Boolean algebras extended with operators. This means that such LFIs satisfy the replacement property. The weakest LFI satisfying replacement presented here is called RmbC, which is obtained from the basic LFI called mbC. Some axiomatic extensions of RmbC are also studied, and in addition a neighborhood semantics is defined for such systems. It is shown that RmbC can be defined within the minimal bimodal non-normal logic E+E defined by the fusion of the non-normal modal logic E with itself. Finally, the framework is extended to first-order languages. RQmbC, the quantified extension of RmbC, is shown to be sound and complete w.r.t. BALFI semantics. (shrink)

Boolean-valued models of set theory were independently introduced by Scott, Solovay and Vopěnka in 1965, offering a natural and rich alternative for describing forcing. The original method was adapted by Takeuti, Titani, Kozawa and Ozawa to lattice-valued models of set theory. After this, Löwe and Tarafder proposed a class of algebras based on a certain kind of implication which satisfy several axioms of ZF. From this class, they found a specific 3-valued model called PS3 which satisfies all the axioms of (...) ZF, and can be expanded with a paraconsistent negation *, thus obtaining a paraconsistent model of ZF. The logic (PS3 ,*) coincides (up to language) with da Costa and D'Ottaviano logic J3, a 3-valued paraconsistent logic that have been proposed independently in the literature by several authors and with different motivations such as CluNs, LFI1 and MPT. We propose in this paper a family of algebraic models of ZFC based on LPT0, another linguistic variant of J3 introduced by us in 2016. The semantics of LPT0, as well as of its first-order version QLPT0, is given by twist structures defined over Boolean agebras. From this, it is possible to adapt the standard Boolean-valued models of (classical) ZFC to twist-valued models of an expansion of ZFC by adding a paraconsistent negation. We argue that the implication operator of LPT0 is more suitable for a paraconsistent set theory than the implication of PS3, since it allows for genuinely inconsistent sets w such that [(w = w)] = 1/2 . This implication is not a 'reasonable implication' as defined by Löwe and Tarafder. This suggests that 'reasonable implication algebras' are just one way to define a paraconsistent set theory. Our twist-valued models are adapted to provide a class of twist-valued models for (PS3,*), thus generalizing Löwe and Tarafder result. It is shown that they are in fact models of ZFC (not only of ZF). (shrink)

In this paper we propose a very general de nition of combination of logics by means of the concept of sheaves of logics. We first discuss some properties of this general definition and list some problems, as well as connections to related work. As applications of our abstract setting, we show that the notion of possible-translations semantics, introduced in previous papers by the first author, can be described in categorial terms. Possible-translations semantics constitute illustrative cases, since they provide a new (...) semantical account for abstract logical systems, particularly for many-valued and paraconsistent logics. (shrink)

This paper reviews the central points and presents some recent developments of the epistemic approach to paraconsistency in terms of the preservation of evidence. Two formal systems are surveyed, the basic logic of evidence (BLE) and the logic of evidence and truth (LET J ), designed to deal, respectively, with evidence and with evidence and truth. While BLE is equivalent to Nelson’s logic N4, it has been conceived for a different purpose. Adequate valuation semantics that provide decidability are given for (...) both BLE and LET J . The meanings of the connectives of BLE and LET J , from the point of view of preservation of evidence, is explained with the aid of an inferential semantics. A formalization of the notion of evidence for BLE as proposed by M. Fitting is also reviewed here. As a novel result, the paper shows that LET J is semantically characterized through the so-called Fidel structures. Some opportunities for further research are also discussed. (shrink)

There are two foundational, but not fully developed, ideas in paraconsistency, namely, the duality between paraconsistent and intuitionistic paradigms, and the introduction of logical operators that express meta-logical notions in the object language. The aim of this paper is to show how these two ideas can be adequately accomplished by the Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs) and by the Logics of Formal Undeterminedness (LFUs). LFIs recover the validity of the principle of explosion in a paraconsistent scenario, while LFUs recover the (...) validity of the principle of excluded middle in a paracomplete scenario. We introduce definitions of duality between inference rules and connectives that allow comparing rules and connectives that belong to different logics. Two formal systems are studied, the logics mbC and mbD, that display the duality between paraconsistency and paracompleteness as a duality between inference rules added to a common core– in the case studied here, this common core is classical positive propositional logic (CPL + ). The logics mbC and mbD are equipped with recovery operators that restore classical logic for, respectively, consistent and determined propositions. These two logics are then combined obtaining a pair of logics of formal inconsistency and undeterminedness (LFIUs), namely, mbCD and mbCDE. The logic mbCDE exhibits some nice duality properties. Besides, it is simultaneously paraconsistent and paracomplete, and able to recover the principles of excluded middle and explosion at once. The last sections offer an algebraic account for such logics by adapting the swap-structures semantics framework of the LFIs the LFUs. This semantics highlights some subtle aspects of these logics, and allows us to prove decidability by means of finite non-deterministic matrices. (shrink)

The goal of this programmatic paper is to highlight a close connection between the core problem in the philosophy of medicine, i.e. the concept of health, and the core problem of the philosophy of mind, i.e. the concept of consciousness. I show when we look at these phenomena together, taking the evolutionary perspective of modern state-based behavioural and life-history theory used as the teleonomic tool to Darwinize the agent- and subject-side of organisms, we will be in a better position to (...) make sense of them both as natural phenomena. (shrink)

As scientific progress approaches the point where significant human enhancements could become reality, debates arise whether such technologies should be made available. This paper evaluates the widespread concern that human enhancements will inevitably accentuate existing inequality and analyzes whether prohibition is the optimal public policy to avoid this outcome. Beyond these empirical questions, this paper considers whether the inequality objection is a sound argument against the set of enhancements most threatening to equality, i.e., cognitive enhancements. In doing so, I shall (...) argue that cognitive enhancements can be embraced wholeheartedly, for three separate reasons. However, though the inequality objection does not sufficiently support the conclusion that cognitive enhancements should be prohibited, it raises several concerns for optimal policy design that shall be addressed here. (shrink)

In a recent special issue dedicated to Dani Rodrik’s (2015) influential monograph Economics Rules, Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni (2018) raise a potentially damning problem for Rodrik’s suggestion that progress in economics should be understood and measured laterally, by a continuous expansion of new models. They argue that this could lead to an “embarrassment of riches”, i.e. the rapid expansion of our model library to such an extent that we become unable to choose between the available models, and thus needs to be (...) solved to make ‘model pluralism’ viable. Drawing on Veit’s (2019a) ‘model pluralism’ account, this paper argues that model pluralism as a thesis about the relationship between science and nature undermines the very idea of a general model selection framework for policy making. (shrink)

When William James published Pragmatism, he gave it a subtitle: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking. In this article, I argue that pragmatism is an epistemological method for articulating success in, and between, a plurality of practices, and that this articulation helped James develop radical empiricism. I contend that this pluralistic philosophical methodology is evident in James’s approach to philosophy of religion, and that this method is also exemplified in the work of one of James’s most famous (...) students, W.E.B. Du Bois, specifically in the closing chapter of The Souls of Black Folk, “Of the Sorrow Songs.” I argue that “Sorrow Songs” can be read as an epistemological text, and that once one identifies the epistemic standards of pragmatism and radical empiricism in the text, it’s possible to identify an implicit case for moderate fideism in “Sorrow Songs.” I contend that this case illuminates the pluralistic philosophical methodology James worked throughout his career to develop, and that the James-Du Bois approach to philosophy may even help locate the epistemic value of other religious practices, beyond the singing of hymns, and identify terrain mainstream philosophy has long neglected. (shrink)

The essay aims at demonstrating that it is dangerous to try to reconstruct a philosophical doctrine taking into account solely or predominantly the analysis of vocabulary. This is particularly true of the philosophical doctrines of the ancients, who generally did not feel obliged to adopt a coherent and unambiguous technical terminology. Starting from the essay of F. Camera, Sui molteplici significati di hermeneia in Platone, which was published in 2004 and then re-edited in 2011 with few modifications but with a (...) different title, the author shows that the method of facing Plato’s hermeneutics through the ἑρμηνεύειν-words is a source of distortions and over-interpretations; that is, it causes excessive density and conceptual significance to be attributed to words used instead in their current meaning. One must remember, even if it should be well known to anyone who devotes himself to these themes, that not all words, expressions and concepts become philosophical entities only because they appear in the works of an author tagged “philosophy.”. (shrink)

This essay deals with the recent book Studies on the Derveni Papyrus, Volume 2, edited by Glenn W. Most (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2022). After assessing its merits and shortcomings, it makes some general points about current publishing, research ethics, and the dangers of co-optation in collaborative work.

Dobzhansky, Theodosius; Ruse, Michael; Pigliucci, Massimo; Teehan, John. Ética e evolução. Tradução de Ediovani Antônio Gaboardi, Iago Pereira da Silva, Maíra Bittencourt, Maria Irene Baggio, Matheus Adriano Ferreira Coelho, Miécimo Ribeiro Moreira Júnior, Paulo Marcos da Silva, Walter Valdevino Oliveira Silva. Editora do PPGFil-UFRRJ & Associação Brasileira de Filosofia e História da Biologia – ABFHIB, 2024. ISBN 978-65-01-19441-7 -/- Este livro digital apresenta a tradução de uma coletânea de artigos que exploram a interseção entre ética e evolução, com o (...) objetivo de mostrar como esses dois domínios se entrelaçam e se influenciam. Cada artigo representa uma contribuição importante para o debate contemporâneo sobre a ética evolutiva, abordando temas que vão desde a relação entre moralidade e evolução biológica até a influência da religião, sob uma ótica evolutiva, na formação dos princípios éticos. Reunimos aqui o trabalho de quatro pensadores de destaque nessa discussão: Theodosius Dobzhansky, Michael Ruse, Massimo Pigliucci e John Teehan. -/- Os artigos traduzidos nesta coletânea foram organizados cronologicamente, permitindo que o leitor possa ter uma visão abrangente da própria complexificação, não necessariamente linear, das discussões ao longo das últimas décadas. Os artigos elegidos também mostram como, desde os anos 1970 e até os anos 2020, a relação entre evolução, moralidade e aspectos culturais é um tópico de intensa discussão entre biólogos e filósofos. Para aprofundar o contexto intelectual em que os artigos foram produzidos, as traduções são precedidas de uma breve descrição das demais contribuições de seus autores. (shrink)

Eliminativism is a position most readily associated with the eliminative materialism of the Churchlands, denying that there are such things as propositional states. This position has created much controversy, despite the fact that intentionality has long been seen as perhaps the core problem for naturalistic philosophy. There is a more radical interpretation of eliminativism, however, denying not only mental states, such as beliefs and desires, but also intentionality (i.e., aboutness) on a global level. This position traces its contemporary origin back (...) to Quine, but has generally been assumed to undermine naturalism or, worse, to be incoherent by the majority of philosophers who maintain that there clearly are things or mental states that are about others. In a recent paper, Hutto and Satne (2015a) offer an update that tries to revive John Haugeland’s baseball analogy from his influential 1990 review paper The Intentionality All-Stars on the state of the game to argue that the failure of Neo-Cartesians, Neo- Behaviorists, and Neo-Pragmatists should urge us to make them work together to naturalize content and “win the game.” But Hutto and Satne misunderstand what the game is ultimately about. The goal of the Intentionality All-Stars is not to naturalize content against eliminativism but to defend a naturalist “thirdperson” view of the problem against first-person phenomenalists. For this goal, a naturalist defense of global content eliminativism would equally enable them to emerge victorious. Revisiting Haugeland, I will offer my own analysis of the current state of play to argue that global content eliminativism has not received sufficient attention and deserves a more prominent place in the debate than it currently occupies. (shrink)

As democracias ocidentais contemporâneas caracterizam-se pelo consenso a respeito da defesa dos direitos individuais fundamentais. O princípio da igualdade, tanto em sua formulação jurídica quanto em sua expressão social, tem por objetivo fazer com que fatores como poder econômico, influência política, origem familiar e preferências pessoais não possam promover desigualdades que não possuem justificativa moral. O princípio da liberdade tem por objetivo garantir espaço para a autonomia e a livre expressão individual. O conflito entre esses dois princípios, como se sabe, (...) define o contexto tanto das conquistas e dos impasses dos regimes democráticos quanto o contexto do debate filosófico a respeito da fundamentação da democracia. -/- Minha tese é a de que a instauração do individualismo nas democracias ocidentais é o resultado de um longo processo de desenvolvimento histórico que estabeleceu a igualdade – e não a liberdade – como o princípio organizador fundamental da ordem social democrática. Essa reavaliação permite superar os impasses gerados por teorias que colocam a autonomia e a racionalidade como fundamento das sociedades democráticas, inflacionando, assim, o conceito de liberdade, restringindo a política a processos de deliberação que deveriam se aproximar de condições idealizadas que não encontram correspondência na prática social e, quase sempre, pressupondo definições para o que seria a natureza humana, a escolha racional ou uma verdadeira autenticidade ou esclarecimento que permitiria escapar de todos os tipos de determinações heterônomas. -/- Para indicar em que sentido proponho essa reavaliação, inicio retomando a obra de Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859). Proveniente de uma família aristocrata em plena época pós-revolucionária na França, Tocqueville analisa a formação dos Estados Unidos da América mostrando que, na instauração da democracia americana, o ideal de igualdade ocupa um lugar anterior ao ideal de liberdade não só historicamente, mas também na justificação e na prática do sistema democrático. Subverte-se, assim, tanto a leitura da modernidade enquanto tentativa de efetivar conjuntamente os ideais de igualdade e liberdade, quanto a leitura de que o traço essencial da modernidade seria a instauração de uma racionalidade que acabou tornando-se instrumental ou técnica. Na primeira metade do século XIX, com uma interpretação que evita o unilateralismo, Tocqueville constata que a característica principal das democracias é o fato de que os homens, colocados em situação de igualdade, isolados e entregues a si mesmos, são indivíduos frágeis que, desprovidos de tradições, só possuem a razão para tentar justificar as leis que devem se auto-impor. -/- Essa leitura tocquevilleana negativa da democracia moderna permite compreender fenômenos contemporâneos aparentemente tão incompatíveis quanto, por exemplo, o isolamento social e o amplo consenso em relação aos direitos humanos ou as instituições jurídicas como instância última de mediação dos conflitos sociais e a falência praticamente completa da lei e de quaisquer instrumentos de poder para lidar com questões humanas e, mais recentemente, tecnológicas. -/- O individualismo democrático é, fundamentalmente, a consequência da efetivação cada vez maior do ideal moderno de igualdade. A filosofia política precisa levar a sério o fato de que, ao mesmo tempo em que corrói o ideal de uma racionalidade autofundante, essa condição democrática abre espaço, como nunca antes na história humana, para a responsabilidade individual. Essa responsabilidade é que nos permite, enquanto seres limitados e contingentes, chegar mais perto do ideal moderno de autonomia e autodeterminação. (shrink)

The global COVID-19 pandemic has spotlighted several instances of churches violating state issued and scientifically recommended guidelines designed to keep populations healthy and to prevent the further spread of the disease. While these instances are minority responses to these orders, they nonetheless raise questions about the rationality of ecclesial belonging in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In this article, I draw on the work of William James and W. E. B. Du Bois to articulate a conception of ecclesial belonging as (...) a social epistemological process engaging a complex, fluid multiplicity of knowers of various scales. I argue that, in this view, ecclesial rationality involves the construction of a concatenation of internal and external practices individual believers and groups can traverse so long as they consistently satisfy a plurality of desiderata. I suggest that what is irrational about religious-based defiance of COVID-19 guidelines is the church-sanctioned severance of internal from external practices. I suggest that this behavior is supported by a failure to grasp the demands of ecclesial rationality rather than embrace them, and that this conception of rationality may have been eroded by the value-neutral skepticism of secular rationality. (shrink)

One of the primary concerns in animal research is ensuring the welfare of laboratory animals. Modern views on animal welfare emphasize the role of animal sentience, i.e. the capacity to experience subjective states such as pleasure or suffering, as a central component of welfare. The increasing official recognition of animal sentience has had large effects on laboratory animal research. The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness (Low et al., University of Cambridge, 2012) marked an official scientific recognition of the presence of sentience (...) in mammals, birds, and cephalopods. Animal sentience has furthermore been recognized in legislation in the European Union, UK, New Zealand and parts of Australia, with discussions underway in other parts of the world to follow suit. In this paper, we analyze this shift towards recognition of sentience in the regulation and practice in the treatment of laboratory animals and its effects on animal welfare and use. (shrink)

This is the report on the XVI BRAZILIAN LOGIC CONFERENCE (EBL 2011) held in Petrópolis, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil between May 9–13, 2011 published in The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic Volume 18, Number 1, March 2012. -/- The 16th Brazilian Logic Conference (EBL 2011) was held in Petro ́polis, from May 9th to 13th, 2011, at the Laboratório Nacional de Computação o Científica (LNCC). It was the sixteenth in a series of conferences that started in 1977 with the aim of (...) congregating logicians from Brazil and abroad, furthering interest in logic and its applications, stimulating cooperation, and contributing to the development of this branch of science. EBL 2011 included more than one-hundred and fifty participants, all of them belonging to prominent research institutes from Brazil and abroad, especially Latin America. The conference was sponsored by the Academia Brasileira de Ciências (ABC), the As- sociation for Symbolic Logic (ASL), Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP), Centre for Logic, Epistemology and the History of Sciences (CLE), Laboratório Nacional de Computação o Científica (LNCC), Pontif ́ıcia Universidade Cato ́lica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC- Rio), Sociedade Brasileira de Lógica (SBL), and Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF). Funding was provided by Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Cient ́ıfico e Tecnolo ́ gico (CNPq), Fundac ̧a ̃o de Amparo `a Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP), Fundação Euclides da Cunha (FEC), and Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF). The members of the Scientific Committee were: Mário Folhadela Benevides (COPPE- UFRJ), Fa ́bio Bertato (CLE-IFCH-UNICAMP), Jean-Yves Béziau (UFRJ), Ricardo Bianconi (USP), Juliana Bueno-Soler (UFABC), Xavier Caicedo (Universidad de Los An- des), Walter Carnielli (CLE-IFCH-UNICAMP), Oswaldo Chateaubriand Filho (PUC-Rio), Marcelo Esteban Coniglio (CLE-IFCH-UNICAMP), Newton da Costa (UFSC, President), Antonio Carlos da Rocha Costa (UFRG), Alexandre Costa-Leite (UnB), I ́tala M. Loffredo D’Ottaviano (CLE-IFCH-UNICAMP), Marcelo Finger (USP), Edward Hermann Haeusler (PUC-Rio), Décio Krause (UFSC), João Marcos (UFRN), Ana Teresa de Castro Martins (UFC), Maria da Paz Nunes de Medeiros (UFRN), Francisco Miraglia (USP), Luiz Car- los Pereira (PUC-Rio and UFRJ), Elaine Pimentel (UFMG), and Samuel Gomes da Silva (UFBA). The members of the Organizing Committee were: Anderson de Araujo (UNICAMP), Walter Carnielli (CLE-IFCH-UNICAMP), Oswaldo Chateaubriand Filho (PUC-Rio, Co- chair), Marcelo Correa (UFF), Renata de Freitas (UFF), Edward Hermann Haeusler (PUC- RJ), Hugo Nobrega (COPPE-UFRJ), Luiz Carlos Pereira (PUC-Rio e IFCS/UFRJ), Leandro Suguitani (UNICAMP), Rafael Testa (UNICAMP), Leonardo Bruno Vana (UFF), and Petrucio Viana (UFF, Co-chair). (shrink)

Despite their influence on later philosophers such as Hume, Malebranche's central arguments for occasionalism remain deeply puzzling. Both the famous ‘no necessary connection’ argument and what I call the epistemic argument include assumptions – e.g., that a true cause is logically necessarily connected to its effect – that seem unmotivated, even in their context. I argue that a proper understanding of late scholastic views lets us see why Malebranche would make this assumption. Both arguments turn on the claim that a (...) volition is the only candidate for a cause, because only a volition can include an effect as its intentional content. (shrink)

EN In his “Logic, Language, and Knowledge” Chateaubriand denounces the tyranny of belief , but takes some positions on knowledge and justification which seem to be too exacting. The fact that Chateaubriand derives constraints on the notion of justification by a close parallel to the notion of proof makes it unnecessarily loaded with the individual, rather than with the collective perspective. His position seems to leave little room for common knowledge, collective knowledge and usual common-sense knowledge, and absolutely no room (...) for explaining how people take correct decisions based on apparently faulty notions of knowledge and justification. -/- PT Em “Logic, Language, and Knowledge” Chateaubriand denuncia a tirania da crença , mas toma posições sobre conhecimento e justificação que parecem demasiado exigentes. O fato de Chateaubriand derivar condições sobre a noção de justificação a partir de uma estreita analogia com a noção de prova torna a noção de justiticação desnecessariamente carregada com a perspectiva indivídual, em detrimento da perspectiva coletiva. Sua posição parece deixar pouco espaço para noções como conhecimento comum, conhecimento coletivo e senso comum, e absolutamente nenhum espaço para explicar como as pessoas tomam decisões corretas com base em noções aparentemente errôneas de conhecimento e de justificação. (shrink)

La filosofía de la educación ocupa un lugar paradójico en el campo de los saberes. Diversas producciones teóricas - de filósofos y pedagogos - convergen en señalar este carácter problemático. Siendo un área temática propia de la filosofía, resulta un espacio en general poco disputado entre los filósofos, como si la educación no estuviera entre las grandes preocupaciones filosóficas de nuestro tiempo. Por el contrario, suelen ser pedagogos quienes llevan a cabo investigaciones y publicaciones en el área y, más aún, (...) quienes ofrecen la disciplina en universidades e institutos de formación. Por lo menos en la inmensa mayoría de las universidades de América Latina, filosofía de la educación, como disciplina, ya no pertenece a los Departamentos o Facultades de Filosofía sino a los de Ciencias de la Educación o Pedagogía. En filosofía de la educación, el “de” ha pasado de indicar materia y tema, aplicación de la filosofía, a señalar pertenencia a la educación. En los Congresos de Filosofía no suele siquiera conformarse un área de la materia. Con reticencias, algunas veces los filósofos admiten discutir cuestiones de didáctica de la filosofía. (shrink)

As proposições condicionais receberam atenção teórica concentrada, embora intermitente, desde a Antiguidade. A atenção durante últimos quarenta anos tem sido intensa. Nesse artigo, apresentaremos os principais desenvolvimentos da análise lógica acerca das proposições condicionais e discutiremos como elas desempenham papel central em muitas teorias filosóficas. Na primeira parte dessas observações introdutórias, mostraremos como os antigos, principalmente as escolas megárica e estoica, envolveram-se com a questão dos condicionais e quão importante isso foi para os posteriores desenvolvimentos da análise lógica dos condicionais (...) no medievo e na Idade Moderna. Por fim, apresentaremos, já na contemporaneidade, C. I. Lewis expondo sua teoria da implicação estrita em franca oposição à doutrina da implicação que ele julgava errada. Espera-se que este trabalho sirva como a apresentação panorâmica de um campo que em lógica ainda é muito frutífero e fecundo para aprofundamentos e novas ideias. (shrink)

In this chapter, one considers finance at its very foundations, namely, at the place where assumptions are being made about the ways to measure the two key ingredients of finance: risk and return. It is well known that returns for a large class of assets display a number of stylized facts that cannot be squared with the traditional views of 1960s financial economics (normality and continuity assumptions, i.e. Brownian representation of market dynamics). Despite the empirical counterevidence, normality and continuity assumptions (...) were part and parcel of financial theory and practice, embedded in all financial practices and beliefs. Our aim is to build on this puzzle for extracting some clues revealing the use of one research strategy in academic community, model tinkering defined as a particular research habit. We choose to focus on one specific moment of the scientific controversies in academic finance: the ‘leptokurtic crisis’ opened by Mandelbrot in 1962. The profoundness of the crisis came from the angle of the Mandelbrot’s attack: not only he emphasized an empirical inadequacy of the Brownian representation, but also he argued for an inadequate grounding of this representation. We give some insights in this crisis and display the model tinkering strategies of the financial academic community in the 1970s and the 1980s. (shrink)

Much of the literature from political psychology has focused on the negative traits that are positively associated with affective polarization—e.g., animus, arrogance, distrust, hostility, and outrage. Not as much attention has been focused on the positive traits that might be negatively associated with polarization. For instance, given that people who are intellectually humble display greater openness and less hostility towards conflicting viewpoints (Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse, 2016; Hopkin et al., 2014; Porter & Schumann, 2018), one might reasonably expect them to be (...) less polarized. -/- We ran two studies designed to explore the relationship between various forms of humility and polarization. Our chief finding is that people who value humility are prone to what we are calling epistemic polarization—that is, judging the epistemic traits of contrapartisans negatively—which in turn plays a role in polarization more generally. Not only are contrapartisans deemed to have the wrong moral and political beliefs, they are also viewed as less humble and more arrogant, close-minded, and irrational. This makes matters even worse when it comes to the growing partisan divide. In light of our findings, we believe that the novel concept of epistemic polarization that we introduce is a promising target for further investigation. (shrink)

Collected essays consider points of affinity and friction between Walter Benjamin and Martin Heidegger. Despite being contemporaries, Walter Benjamin and Martin Heidegger never directly engaged with one another. Yet, Hannah Arendt, who knew both men, pointed out common ground between the two. Both were concerned with the destruction of metaphysics, the development of a new way of reading and understanding literature and art, and the formulation of radical theories about time and history. On the other hand, their life (...) trajectories and political commitments were radically different. In a 1930 letter, Benjamin told a friend that he had been reading Heidegger and that if the two were to engage with one another, “sparks will fly.” Acknowledging both their affinities and points of conflict, this volume stages that confrontation, focusing in particular on temporality, Romanticism, and politics in their work. (shrink)

There is a particular ressonance between the thinking of Walter Benjamin and that of the German jurist Carl Schmitt, including the fact that both analyse the 16th and 17th centuries in order to understand the 20th. Regarding this fact, the article attempts to clarify some themes that lead Schmitt’s work, i.e that of State of Exception, that of theologization of politics, the critique of parliamentarism as support of the Modern State, the tension between democracy and dictatorship, to explain how (...) the dialog between the two thinkers occurs, seeking thus for a better understanding of key works of Benjamin, specially The Origin of German Tragic Drama. (shrink)

The topic of the paper is the role of assensus, and consequently of divine and human will, in Walter Chatton’s theory of prophecy (Reportatio super Sententias I, dd. 39-41). Starting from the question “how God knows the future contingents?”, the first step will be to consider Chatton’s analysis of Scotus’s voluntarism in the light of the concept of divine assensus, meaning as a model for the prophet’s will and, more generally, for the human wills. The paper will then focus (...) on the role of assensus in the act whereby which a truth is being revealed to the prophet; it is described as a sort of “induced” assent, where the will is bypassed and so, paradoxically, “unwilling”. Finally, the role of the will returns to be crucial on a third level, namely the viator’s assent to the prophetic statements, where assensus makes freedom of will possible, consistent with the divine foreknowledge, avoiding the danger of deterministic consequences. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article focuses on the role that the concept of “presence of mind” (Geistesgegenwart) plays in Walter Benjamin’s thought, deepening lines of interpretation that are connected to other relevant concepts such as “attention” (Aufmerksamkeit) and “now-time” (Jetztzeit). It examines elements of Benjamin’s work that develop the philosophical importance of presence of mind, emphasizing its corporeal dimension and its aesthetic and critical relevance. The analysis covers fve lines of interpretation that intersect in different ways: (i) presence of mind is (...) a form of thought/action that should be cultivated as a way of dealing with the experience of shock; (ii) having presence of mind is an attitude that can be exercised; (iii) “seizing the day” involves the body and presupposes an experience of intensive time; (iv) the conceptual framework of presence of mind integrates elements related to play; and (v) by valuing the present, presence of mind implies a relationship between danger and a critical gesture – in Benjamin’s historical and political reflection, this gesture intertwines the individual and the collective dimensions. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to try to understand the role of pornography through a number of different channels, namely: the work of art and technology. To understand how the work of art passed from an erotic position to a pornographic one, with explicitly political motivations. To this end, our main references are Walter Benjamin’s work The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technical Reproducibility (1936) and Polly Barton’s Porn: An Oral History (2023). -/- O presente (...) artigo tem por objetivo elaborar uma tentativa de compreender o papel da pornografia através de algumas instâncias, nomeadamente da obra de arte e da tecnologia. Compreender como a obra de arte passou de uma posição erótica para uma posição pornográfica com motivações explicitamente políticas. Para isso, temos como principal referência o texto de Walter Benjamin, A obra de arte na era de sua reprodutibilidade técnica (1936) e o texto de Polly Barton, Porn: An Oral History (2023). (shrink)

The literary genesis of Einbahnstraße by Walter Benjamin represents a very special case of the use of the procedures of surrealism in the philosophical-literary production of the author. The process of evolution of thinking that ended up in the writing of this piece is unveiled throughout the present analysis. This is a sign of both waiver and restart; the opening for a new productive dimension in the career of one of the most important —and misunderstood— philosophers of the 20th (...) century. More than enlightening a small master piece of philosophy from a literary perspective, or analyzing a small master piece of literature from the philosophy, what is being problematized here is the division, cultivated or figured throughout the years, between both disciplines. This work is intended to recover what is insoluble from the philosophical-literary labor of Walter Benjamin, besides tracing a possible reconfiguration for an interdisciplinary field of work to come up and contribute in the understanding of the problem called The Retreat of Metaphor by Jacques Derrida. (shrink)

Ce mémoire vise à élucider le rapport entre la violence et le pouvoir souverain à partir de la Critique de la violence de Walter Benjamin et Force de loi de Jacques Derrida. Les réflexions proposées ici sont issues de deux constats : (i) que nos structures politiques reposent sur l’emploi continu de la violence et (ii) qu’une révolution abolit l’ordre existant en s’accordant le monopole sur la violence légitime, reconduisant ainsi le cycle de la violence. Pour sortir de cette (...) impasse, Benjamin imagine une violence capable de destituer le pouvoir souverain, c’est-à-dire de l’abolir sans pour autant le saisir à son tour. Ce mémoire poursuit le développement du concept de destitution en trois temps. Dans un premier temps, nous lisons de près la Critique de la violence de Benjamin. Dans un deuxième temps, nous approfondissons notre analyse avec la lecture déconstructive proposée par Derrida dans Force de loi. Finalement, le concept de destitution est enrichi par des travaux contemporains et examiné sous l’angle de la responsabilité pour l’avenir. -/- *** -/- This thesis investigates the relationship between violence and sovereign power by drawing on Walter Benjamin's Critique of Violence and Jacques Derrida's Force de loi. The reflections proposed here are based on two observations: (i) that our political structures are based on the continuous use of violence, and (ii) that a revolution abolishes the existing order by granting itself a monopoly on legitimate violence, thus renewing the cycle of violence. To break this deadlock, Benjamin imagines a form of violence capable of destituting sovereign power, i.e. abolishing it without seizing it. This dissertation further develops the concept of destitution in three steps. First, we carefully read Benjamin's Critique of Violence. Secondly, we deepen our analysis with the deconstructive reading proposed by Derrida in Force de loi. Finally, we enrich the concept of destitution with contemporary works and examine it through the lens of responsibility for what is to come. (shrink)

In this essay, we reconsider two themes particularly discussed by the interpreters of Ockham: that of divine omnipotence and the hypothesis of the intuitive cognition of non-existent things. The purpose is to show that the hypothetical case considered by Ockham was subjected to opposite interpretations. For theological reasons, Ockham attributes not only to God but also to human beings the possibility of having acts of intuitive cognition of things that do not exist; nonetheless, he holds that it is contradictory for (...) God to give us the evident cognition of things that appear to be present when they are actually absent. Walter Chatton opposes this conclusion, arguing that no contradiction ensues from that hypothesis. Instead, he believes that it is impossible for God to give us the intuition of things that absolutely do not exist or are in no way present to us. Ockham’s arguments include some difficulties that Chatton acutely sees and discusses. In particular, Chatton calls into question Ockham’s missed distinction between the existence and the presence of the intuited thing. (shrink)

Durante uma competição que envolveu Lord Byron, Polidori e Percy Shelley, numa prova de quem seria capaz de criar a melhor história de horror, nasce o rascunho de o que conhecemos hoje como Frankenstein. Aprovado e exaltado pela crítica, o novo romance de horrores, que marca o início da segunda fase do gótico, é tido por Walter Scott como uma obra que investiga as condições e implicações do conhecimento e da imaginação humana. Não é novidade que o gênero gótico (...) é tido como uma marca e um local no qual temas marginalizados e silenciados podem ser tratados de forma aberta, os ideais deixados por grandes filósofos como, por exemplo, Bacon e Descartes passam a ser questionados e têm suas implicações levadas às últimas consequências. Frankenstein não foge dessa regra. O romance se distingue por conta da formação do arquétipo do cientista louco, do medo dos avanços científicos e a superação de limites através da artificialidade que são caracterizados, em última instância, no ato de "brincar" de Deus e tentar conferir vida a uma matéria morta. Dito isso, meu objetivo é explorar, em primeiro lugar, de que maneira este romance se posiciona perante os ideais filosóficos (especialmente científicos); em segundo lugar, como recusa tais ideais e, por fim, de que maneira se difere dos romances góticos que o antecedeu. (shrink)

PREMISSA No século XIX, ocorreram transformações impulsionadas pela emergência de novas fontes energéticas (água e petróleo), por novos ramos industriais e pela alteração profunda nos processos produtivos, com a introdução de novas máquinas e equipamentos. Depois de 300 anos de exploração por parte das nações europeias, iniciou -se, principalmente nas colônias latino-americanas, um processo intenso de lutas pela independência. É no século XIX, já com a consolidação do sistema capitalista na Europa, que se encontra a herança intelectual mais próxima da (...) qual surgirá a Sociologia como ciência particular. No início desse século, as ideias do Conde de Saint-Simon (1760-1825), de Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), de David Ricardo (1772-1823) e de Charles Darwin (1809-1882), entre outros, foram o elo para que Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859), Auguste Comte (1798-1857), Karl Marx (1818 -1883) e Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), entre outros, desenvolvessem reflexões sobre a sociedade de seu tempo. Auguste Comte e Karl Marx foram os pensadores que lançaram as bases do pensamento sociológico e de duas grandes tradições – a positivista e a socialista – que muito influenciaram o desenvolvimento da Sociologia no Brasil. 1 AUGUSTE COMTE E A TRADIÇÃO POSITIVISTA Isidore Auguste Marie François Xavier Comte nasceu em Montpellier, na França, em 19 de janeiro de 1798. Com 16 anos de idade, ingressou na Escola Politécnica de Paris, fato que teria significativa influência na orientação posterior de seu pensamento. De 1817 a 1824, foi secretário do Conde de Saint-Simon. Comte declarou que, com Saint -Simon, aprendeu muitas coisas que jamais encontraria nos livros e que, no pouco tempo em que conviveu com o conde, fez mais progressos do que faria em muitos anos, se estivesse sozinho. Toda a obra de Comte está permeada pelos acontecimentos que ocorreram após a Revolução Francesa de 1789. Ele defendeu parte dos princípios revolucionários e criticou a restauração da monarquia, preocupando-se fundamentalmente em reorganizar a sociedade, que, no seu entender, estava em ebulição e mergulhada no caos. Para Comte, a desordem e a anarquia imperavam em virtude da confusão de princípios (metafísicos e teológicos), que não se adequavam à sociedade industrial em expansão. Era, portanto, necessário superar esse estado de coisas, usando a razão como fundamento da nova sociedade. Propôs, então, a mudança da sociedade por meio da reforma intelectual plena das pessoas. De acordo com o pensador, com a modificação do pensamento humano, por meio do método científico, que ele chamava de “filosofia positiva”, haveria uma reforma das instituições. Com a proposta do estudo da sociedade por meio da análise de seus processos e estruturas, e da reforma prática das instituições, Comte criou uma nova ciência, à qual deu o nome de “física social”, passando a chamá-la posteriormente de Sociologia. A Sociologia representava, para Comte, o coroamento da evolução do conhecimento, mediante o emprego de métodos utilizados por outras ciências, que buscavam conhecer os fenômenos constantes e repetitivos da natureza: a observação, a experimentação, a comparação e a classificação. De acordo com esse pensador, a Sociologia, como as ciências naturais, deve sempre procurar a reconciliação entre os aspectos estáticos e os dinâmicos do mundo natural ou, no caso da sociedade humana, entre a ordem e o progresso. O lema da “filosofia positiva” proposta por Comte era “conhecer para prever, prever para prover”, ou seja, o conhecimento é necessário para fazer previsões e também para solucionar possíveis problemas. A influência de Comte no desenvolvimento da Sociologia foi marcante, sobretudo, na escola francesa, evidenciando-se em Émile Durkheim e seus contemporâneos e seguidores. Seu pensamento esteve presente em muitas das tentativas de criar tipologias para explicar a sociedade. Suas principais obras são: Curso de filosofia positiva (1830-1842), Discurso sobre o espírito positivo (1848), Catecismo positivista (1852) e Sistema de política positiva (1854). Para concluirmos, Comte explanava que para a superação da anarquia reinante na nova sociedade industrial, a filosofia positivista defendia a subordinação do progresso à ordem. O mesmo era contra o retorno de Luís XVIII ao trono: em sua concepção, a sociedade industrial que emergia requeria um governo fundado na razão. 2 A TRADIÇÃO SOCIALISTA: KARL MARX E FRIEDRICH ENGELS Karl Heinrich Marx nasceu em Tréveris, na antiga Prússia, hoje Alemanha, em 1818 e, em 1830, ingressou no Liceu Friedrich Wilhelm, nessa mesma cidade. Anos depois, foi cursar Direito na Universidade de Bonn, transferindo-se para Berlim em seguida. Pouco a pouco, entretanto, seus interesses migraram para a Filosofia, área na qual defendeu, em 1841, a tese de doutorado A diferença da filosofia da natureza em Demócrito e Epicuro. Sua vida universitária foi marcada pelo debate político e intelectual influenciado pelo pensamento de Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872) e, principalmente, pelo de Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770- 1831). Friedrich Engels (1820-1895) nasceu em Barmen (Renânia), na antiga Prússia, hoje Alemanha, filho mais velho de um rico industrial do ramo têxtil. Terminou sua formação secundária em 1837 e a partir de então sua formação intelectual foi por conta própria (autodidata), com alguns cursos universitários esparsos e de curta duração. Desde cedo começou a trabalhar nas empresas de seu pai e foi nessa condição que se deslocou para Bremen por três anos e depois foi enviado pelos pais a Manchester, na Inglaterra, onde trabalhou nas fábricas da família. Engels ficou impressionado com a miséria na qual viviam os trabalhadores das fábricas inglesas. Os dois, Marx e Engels, se encontraram em 1842, quando Marx passou a escrever para A Gazeta Renana, jornal da província de Colônia, do qual Engels era colaborador e mais tarde editor-chefe. O jornal, que criticava o poder prussiano, foi fechado em 1843, e Marx se viu desempregado. Ao perder o emprego, mudou-se para Paris, na França. Ali escreveu, em 1844, os Manuscritos econômico-filosóficos (só publicados em 1932) e, junto com F. Engels, o livro A sagrada família. Por sua vez, F. Engels, em 1844, decidiu voltar para a Alemanha, onde publicou, em 1845, A situação da classe trabalhadora na Inglaterra. Entre 1845 e 1847, Marx exilou-se em Bruxelas, na Bélgica, onde escreveu A ideologia alemã (em parceria com Friedrich Engels) e Miséria da filosofia (1847), obra na qual criticou o filósofo Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865). Em 1848, ainda na Bélgica, a parceria com Engels se solidificou ao escreverem juntos o livreto O Manifesto Comunista. Em 1848, Marx foi expulso da Bélgica e retornou a Colônia, na Alemanha (Prússia), sempre pensando na possibilidade de uma mudança estrutural em sua terra natal. Isso, entretanto, não aconteceu e Marx foi expulso da Alemanha em 1849, ano em que migrou para Londres, na Inglaterra, onde permaneceu até o fim da vida. Lá escreveu O 18 Brumário de Luís Bonaparte (1852), sua mais importante obra de reflexão sobre a vida política europeia do século XIX, desenvolveu pesquisas e concluiu seu maior trabalho: O capital: crítica da economia política. O primeiro volume dessa obra foi publicado em 1867; os outros três, em 1885, 1894 e 1905, após a morte de Marx, revisados por F. Engels. 2.1 O contexto histórico e a obra de Marx e Engels Para situar a obra de Marx e Engels, é necessário conhecer um pouco do que acontecia em meados do século XIX. Com as transformações que ocorriam no mundo ocidental, principalmente na esfera da produção industrial, houve um crescimento expressivo no número de trabalhadores industriais urbanos, com uma consequência evidente: precariedade da vida dos operários nas cidades. As condições de trabalho no interior das fábricas eram péssimas. Os empregados eram superexplorados, alimentavam-se mal e trabalhavam em ambientes insalubres. Para enfrentar essa situação e tentar modificá-la, os trabalhadores passaram a se organizar em associações e sindicatos e a promover movimentos de reivindicação. Desenvolveu-se, então, uma discussão das condições sociais, políticas e econômicas para se definirem as possibilidades de intervenção nessa realidade. Desde o início do século XIX, muitos pensadores discutiram essas questões, nas perspectivas socialista e anarquista. Na Inglaterra podem ser citados, entre outros: William Godwin (1756-1836), Thomas Spence (1750-1814), Thomas Paine (1737-1809), Robert Owen (1771-1858) e Thomas Hodgkin (1787-1866). Na França, destacaram-se Étienne Cabet (1788- 1856), Flora Tristan (1803-1844), Charles Fourier (1772-1837) e Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865). Marx e Engels levaram em conta esses pensadores, debatendo com alguns contemporâneos e criticando-os. Além disso, incorporaram a tradição da economia clássica inglesa, presente principalmente nas obras de Adam Smith e de David Ricardo. Pode-se dizer, portanto, que Marx e Engels desenvolveram seu trabalho com base na análise crítica da economia política inglesa, do socialismo utópico francês e da filosofia alemã. Esses dois autores não buscavam definir uma ciência específica para estudar a sociedade (como a Sociologia, para Auguste Comte) ou situar seu trabalho em um campo científico particular. Em alguns escritos, Marx afirmou que a História seria a ciência que mais se aproximava de suas preocupações, por abarcar as múltiplas dimensões da sociedade, a qual deveria ser analisada na totalidade, não havendo uma separação rígida entre os aspectos sociais, econômicos, políticos, ideológicos, religiosos, culturais etc. O objetivo de Marx e Engels era estudar criticamente a sociedade capitalista com base em seus princípios constitutivos e em seu desenvolvimento, visando dotar a classe trabalhadora de uma análise política da sociedade de seu tempo. Assim, a tradição socialista nascida da luta dos trabalhadores, muitos anos antes e em situações diferentes, tem como expressão intelectual o pensamento de Karl Marx e Friedrich Engels. Para entender as concepções fundamentais de Marx e Engels é necessário fazer a conexão entre as lutas da classe trabalhadora, suas aspirações e as ideias revolucionárias que estavam presentes no século XIX na Europa. Para eles, o conhecimento científico da realidade só tem sentido quando visa à transformação dessa mesma realidade. A separação entre teoria e prática não é discutida, pois a “verdade histórica” não é algo abstrato e que se define teoricamente; sua verificação está na prática. Apesar de haver algumas diferenças em seus escritos, os elementos essenciais do pensamento de Marx e Engels podem ser assim sintetizados: • historicidade das ações humanas – crítica ao idealismo alemão; • divisão social do trabalho e o surgimento das classes sociais – a luta de classes; • o fetichismo da mercadoria e o processo de alienação; • crítica à economia política e ao capitalismo; • transformação social e revolução; • utopia – sociedade comunista. A obra desses dois autores é muito vasta e não ficou vinculada estritamente aos movimentos sociais dos trabalhadores. Pouco a pouco foi introduzida nas universidades como parte do estudo em diferentes áreas do conhecimento. Estudiosos de Filosofia, Sociologia, Ciência Política, Economia, História e Geografia, entre outras áreas, foram influenciados por ela. Na Sociologia, como afirma Irving M. Zeitlin, no livro Ideología y teoría sociológica, tanto Max Weber quanto Émile Durkheim fizeram, em suas obras, um debate com as ideias de Karl Marx. Pelas análises da sociedade capitalista de seu tempo e a repercussão que tiveram em todo o mundo, principalmente no século XX, nos movimentos sociais e nas universidades, Marx e Engels são considerados autores clássicos da Sociologia. No campo dessa disciplina, porém, o pensamento deles ficou um pouco restrito, pois perdeu aquela relação entre teoria e prática (práxis), ou seja, entre a análise crítica e a prática revolucionária. Essa relação esteve presente, por exemplo, na vida e na obra dos russos Vladimir Ilitch Ulianov, conhecido como Lênin (1870-1924), e Leon D. Bronstein, conhecido como Trotsky (1879-1940), da alemã Rosa Luxemburgo (1871-1919) e do italiano Antonio Gramsci (1891- 1937), que tiveram significativa influência no movimento operário do século XX. Com base no trabalho de Marx e Engels, muitos autores desenvolveram estudos acadêmicos em vários campos do conhecimento. Podemos citar, por exemplo, Georg Lukács (1885-1971), Theodor Adorno (1903-1969), Walter Benjamin (1892-1940), Henri Lefebvre (1901-1991), Lucien Goldmanm (1913 -1970), Louis Althusser (1918 -1990), Nikos Poulantzas (1936-1979), Edward P. Thompson (1924-1993) e Eric Hobsbawm (1917 -2012). O pensamento de Marx e Engels continua, assim, presente em todo o mundo, com múltiplas tendências e variações, sempre gerando controvérsias. REFERENCIAL TEÓRICO GEMKOW, H.; PSUA, I. M. L. Marx e Engels: Vida e Obra. São Paulo: Alfa e Ômega, 1984. 232 pp. GIANOTTI, J. A. Comte. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1978. 318 pp. (Col. Os Pensadores) KONDER, L. Marx: vida e obra. 7ª ed. São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2007. 154 pp. (Col. Vida e Obra). (shrink)

This paper discusses two thinkers who locate the possibility of revolutionary historical change in political projects oriented toward the formation of subjects and cultivation of sensibility. I begin by considering the relationship between historical violence and education in the works of Walter Benjamin. After introducing the provocative association of education with divine violence found in “Toward the Critique of Violence,” I expand on Benjamin’s conception of pedagogical force. Highlighting the centrality of education in Benjamin’s early work, I argue that (...) his account of learning does not depend on the mastery of students by teachers, nor more generally on the mastery of objective reality by a sovereign subject, but on the mastery of the educational relationship by tradition. Drawing on W.E.B. Du Bois’ discussion of the abolition of slavery, I close by describing the revolutionary cultivation of sensibility as a dynamic and collectively achieved mode of historical learning. (shrink)

The essay aims to offer a critical theory of psychosocial processes of regressive and depressive type. The Author starts by discussing the determining influence attributed to social suffering in the framework of the moral grammar of social struggle outlined by Axel Honneth, then he offers an analysis of the regressive reactions activate by disrespect experiences. The Author discusses some important points of Walter Benjamin’s philosophy of history, in particularly Benjamin’s critique of traditional concept of progress, and the determining role (...) attributed to suffering; points that are translated and moved in the framework of the analysis of regressive processes. Lastly, the Author shows how a critical theory that aims to reactivate the emancipatory potential immanent in the social suffering today frustrated may find an incisive and productive approach in a critical analysis of regressions. -/- Il saggio mira ad offrire una teoria critica dei processi psicosociali di taglio regressivo e depressivo. L’autore muove dalla centralità attribuita alla sofferenza sociale nel quadro della grammatica morale delle lotte sociali delineato da Axel Honneth, concentrandosi poi sulle reazioni di carattere regressivo indotte dalle esperienze di spregio. Segue la ripresa di alcuni punti fondamentali della filosofia della storia di Walter Benjamin, in particolare della sua critica alla concezione tradizionale di progresso, e la sua peculiare valorizzazione della sofferenza; spunti tradotti e traslati nell’ambito dell’analisi dei processi regressivi. Infine, l’autore mostra come una teoria critica che voglia riattivare i potenziali emancipatori immanenti alla sofferenza sociale oggi frustrati possa trovare un approccio incisivo e fecondo in una analisi critica delle regressioni. (shrink)

In a recent work, Walter Carnielli and Abilio Rodrigues present an epistemically motivated interpretation of paraconsistent logic. In their view, when there is conflicting evidence with regard to a proposition A (i.e. when there is both evidence in favor of A and evidence in favor of ￢A) both A and ￢A should be accepted without thereby accepting any proposition B whatsoever. Hence, reasoning within their system intends to mirror, and thus, should be constrained by, the way in which we (...) reason about evidence. In this article we will thoroughly discuss their position and suggest some ways in which this project can be further developed. The aim of the paper is twofold. On the one hand, we will present some philosophical critiques to the specific epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic proposed by Carnielli & Rodrigues. First, we will contend that Carnielli & Rodrigues’s interpretation implies a thesis about what evidence rationally justifies to accept or believe, called Extreme Permissivism, which is controversial among epistemologists. Second, we will argue that what agents should do, from an epistemic point of view, when faced with conflicting evidence, is to suspend judgment. On the other hand, despite these criticisms we do not believe that the epistemological motivation put forward by Carnielli & Rodrigues is entirely wrong. In the last section, we offer an alternative way in which one might account for the epistemic rationality of accepting contradictions and, thus, for an epistemic understanding of paraconsistency, which leads us to discuss the notion of diachronic epistemic rationality. (shrink)

O ensino de filosofia é hoje feito de diversas formas (práticas), sendo as três principais (ou bases), a histórica, a temática e a criação conceitual. No entanto parece muito mais plausível e até saudável uma combinação entre duas destas formas, ou até as três, mas isto não elimina a problemática das perguntas: "qual é a melhor forma?", ou "qual é a mais certa?" ou ainda "qual é a mais eficaz ou a mais eficiente?", na medida em que estas combinações em (...) si geram mais formas e as perguntas persistem. Uma vez que estas questões ainda não tem uma resposta, e estão longe de ter algum consenso, o ensino de filosofia passa a ser um problema filosófico em si, e é neste cenário que Alejandro Cerletti, introduz seu livro "O ensino de filosofia como problema filosófico". A obra de fato não responde estas perguntas, e não creio ser objetivo do autor responde-las, mas como Walter Kohan escreve na capa interna da edição brasileira de 2009, "pode constituir-se numa ferramenta importante para que cada professor de filosofia possa pensar-se em relação à sua prática." (CERLETTI, 2009). Eu acrescentaria, que muito da discussão aqui, pode ser aplicada a outras práticas disciplinares. (shrink)

Given that mitigating climate change is a large-scale global issue, what obligations do individuals have to lower their personal carbon emissions? I survey recent suggestions by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Dale Jamieson and offer models for thinking about their respective approaches. I then present a third model based on the notion of structural violence. While the three models are not mutually incompatible, each one suggests a different focus for mitigating climate change. In the end, I agree with Sinnott-Armstrong that people (...) have limited moral obligations to directly lower personal emissions, but I offer different reasons for this conclusion, namely that the structural arrangements of our lives place a limit on how much individuals can restrict their own emissions. Thus, individuals should focus their efforts on changing the systems instead (e.g., the design of cities, laws and regulation, etc.), which will lead to lower emissions on a larger scale. (shrink)

Most artworks—or at least most among those standardly subject to philosophical scrutiny—appear to be singular, stand-alone works. However, some artworks (indeed, perhaps a good many) are by contrast best viewed in terms of some larger grouping or ordering of artworks. i.e., as a series. The operative art-theoretic notion of series in which I am interested here is that of an individual and distinct artwork that is itself non-trivially composed of a non-trivial sequence of artworks (e.g., Walter de Maria’s Statement (...) Series, Krzysztof Kieslowski’s Three Colors)—as opposed to an art-historically informative or art critically productive thematically, stylistically, or formally unified ordering or grouping of individual and distinct artworks within an artist’s larger body of work (e.g., Kiki Smith’s Blue Print series, Dan Flavin’s Monuments to V. Tatlin series, Jeff Koons’ Made in Heaven series, Robert Rauschenberg’s Tribute 21 series). Given this, my aim is simply to sketch a minimal descriptive and classificatory framework for serial art within which certain informative distinctions may be made and further philosophical enquiry may productively take place. (shrink)

In the last chapter of The Public and its Problems John Dewey outlines the alleged fallacy of "the democratic creed". According to him the fallacy is described as conflating emancipation with the capacity to rule, i.e. the capacity to make policy decisions. His point is that the power to make decisions does not entail a capacity to make good choices. Capable are those in the know, the experts who are "intellectually qualified". The answer to the fallacy is to propose epistocracy: (...) The rule of experts – as Walter Lippman had come close to arguing. But Dewey tries to refute the argument for epistocracy. He rehearses the old platonic wisdom that the harmonious state... (shrink)

Known as the Darwin of the twenty-first century, the German biologist Ernst Walter Mayr (1904-2005) studied a great variety of subjects such as Ornithology, Genetics, Evolution, Classification, History, and Philosophy of Biology. This scientist was a giant of the previous century and an icon of Evolutionary Biology. He became famous for his Biological Species Concept and his conclusion that allopatry is the main cause for the origin of species. He provided a decisive contribution to the New Systematics and was (...) the pioneer of the punctuated equilibrium idea. Mayr was one of the main architects of the evolutionary synthesis as also of the Neo-Darwinian wave. Evaluated together, all of his works reveal several elements of his ambition – to organize a philosophical conception inherent for Biology. An assiduous defender of autonomous Biology, Mayr asserted that four sets of factors in Biology differ from those in the Exact Sciences: (I) refutation of essentialism, mechanism, vitalism, and teleology; (II) some physical principles cannot be applied to Biology; (III) absence of general laws in Biology; and (IV) basic principles of biology and their specific character cannot be applied to the inanimate world. The present study took as an axis a minor or even invisible theme from the Ernst Mayr literature and aims to analyze critically the theoretical and epistemological basis that subsidizes – or not– the affirmation that Biology is an autonomous Science. - O biólogo alemão Ernst Walter Mayr (1904-2005), conhecido como o Darwin do século XXI, trabalhou com uma grande variedade de temas: Ornitologia, Genética, Evolução, Classificação, História e Filosofia da Biologia. Esse cientista foi um dos gigantes do século XX e um ícone para a Biologia Evolutiva. Ficou famoso com o seu Conceito Biológico de Espécie e sua conclusão de que a alopatria era a principal causa da origem das espécies. Forneceu uma contribuição decisiva à Nova Sistemática, foi precursor da ideia de equilíbrio pontuado e um dos principais arquitetos da síntese evolutiva, bem como do movimento Neodarwinista. Quando avaliados em conjunto, seus trabalhos revelam os diversos elementos de sua ambição – organizar um corpo de concepções filosóficas próprias da Biologia. Defensor assíduo de uma Biologia autônoma, Mayr afirmou que há quatro conjuntos de fatores que diferenciam a Biologia do conjunto das Ciências Exatas: (I) refutação do essencialismo, do mecanicismo, do vitalismo e da teleologia; (II) convicção de que certos princípios da Física não podem ser aplicados à Biologia; (III) ausência de leis naturais universais em Biologia; e (IV) percepção do caráter único de certos princípios básicos da Biologia não aplicáveis ao mundo inanimado. O presente artigo tomou por eixo um tema aparentemente menor ou mesmo invisível na obra de Ernst Mayr e pretende realizar uma análise crítica acerca de suas bases teóricas e epistemológicas que subsidiaram – ou não – a afirmação da Biologia como uma Ciência autônoma. (shrink)

In several essays I have argued that Berkeley maintains the same basic notion of spiritual substance throughout his life. Because that notion is not the traditional (Aristotelian, Cartesian, or Lockean) doctrine of substance, critics (e.g., John Roberts, Tom Stoneham, Talia Mae Bettcher, Margaret Atherton, Walter Ott, Marc Hight) claim that on my reading Berkeley either endorses a Humean notion of substance or has no recognizable theory of substance at all. In this essay I point out how my interpretation does (...) not assume that Berkeley adopts a bundle theory of mind, but instead redefines what it means for a simple substance to be the principle by which ideas are perceived. (shrink)

This book has been inspired by Walter Benjamin’s idea of an afterlife of an original in its translations and probes into a wide variety of extensions of Carroll’s story in six languages. For one thing, it deals with language that speaks and more or less automatically steers its users in a particular direction and, for another, it discusses the creativity of individual translators who not only share a definite picture of the world with their language community but, in great (...) many instances, reveal a unique resourcefulness in resisting its power. Each chapter deals first with a separate theoretical issue (e.g. literalness, style, gender, and tense) and then proceeds to examine its practical actualization in various translations of Alice. (shrink)

This paper is my last word, in the present journal, in the debate I have been having with Walter Block on the subject of evictionism as an alleged libertarian “third way,” capable of transcending the familiar “pro-life” and “pro-choice” dichotomy. In this debate, I myself defended what might be regarded as a qualified “pro-life” position, while Block consistently argued that the mother is morally allowed to expel the fetus from her womb provided that no non-lethal methods of its eviction (...) are available. While my position articulated in this paper contains an element of what Block might consider a concession on my part—i.e., an explicit declaration that abstaining from lethal evictions of fetuses conceived as a result of rape is a libertarian duty, but only an imperfect one—I continue to regard the unqualified support of evictionism as indefensible on libertarian grounds. (shrink)

An antinaturalist defense of causality of mental states. The argument is based on the properties of causal models in cognitive research. Bibliografia prac przywołanych w tekście -/- Damasio A., 1994/1999, Błąd Kartezjusza. Emocje, rozum i ludzki mózg, tłum. M. Karpiński, Poznań: Rebis. Davidson D., 1963/2001, „Actions, reasons, and causes”, w: (Davidson 2001), s. 3-19. Davidson D., 1967/2001, „Causal relations”, w: (Davidson 2001), s. 149-62. Davidson D., 1970/2001, „Mental events”, w: (Davidson 2001), s. 207-25. Davidson D., 1976/2001, „Hempel on explaining action”, (...) w: (Davidson 2001), s. 261-75. Davidson D., 2001, Essays on actions and events, Oxford: Clarendon. Farmer A., McGuffin P., Williams J., 2002, Measuring psychopathology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Freedman D. A., Petitti D. B., 2002, „Salt, blood pressure, and public policy”, International Journal of Epidemiology, t. 31, s. 319–320. Greyson B., 2000, „Near-death experiences”, w: Varieties of anomalous experience. Examining the scientific evidence, red. E. Cardeña, S. J. Lynn i S. Krippner, Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, s. 315-52. Judycki S., 1995, Umysł i synteza, Lublin: RW KUL. Judycki S., 2000, „Transkauzalność a determinizm”, Kognitywistyka i media w edukacji, t. 3, s. 73-86. Kawalec P. 2005, „Understanding science of the new millennium”, http://philsci archive.pitt.edu/archive/00002558/ Kawalec P., 2006, Jak odkryć przyczynę? Studium z ogólnej metodologii i filozofii nauki, Lublin 2006, w przygotowaniu. Kim J., 1998/2002, Umysł w świecie fizycznym, tłum. R. Poczobut, Warszawa: IFiS PAN. Lauritzen S., 1996, Graphical models, Oxford: Clarendon. Menzies P., 2003, „The causal efficacy of mental states”, w: Physicalism and mental causation. The metaphysics of mind and action, red. S. Walter i H.-D. Heckmann, w druku. Pearl J., 2000, Causality. Models, reasoning, and inference, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Piłat R., 1999, Umysł jako model świata, Warszawa: IFiS PAN. Rosenbaum P., 2002, Observational studies, Nowy Jork: Springer. Sabom M., 1998, Life and death. One doctors’s fascinating account of near-death experiences, Grand Rapids: Zondervan. Spirtes P., Glymour C., Scheines R., 2000, Causation, prediction, and search, Cambridge, MA.: MIT. van Fraassen B., 1980, The scientific image, Oxford: Clarendon. van Fraassen B., 2002, The empirical stance, New Haven: Yale University Press. Woodward J., 2003, Making things happen: a theory of causal explanation, Nowy Jork: Oxford University Press. Żegleń U., 2003, Filozofia umysłu, Toruń: A. Marszałek. (shrink)

The common view is that no novel IS an argument, though it might be reconstructed as one. This is curious, for we almost always feel the need to reconstruct arguments even when they are uncontroversially given as arguments, as in a philosophical text. We make the points as explicit, orderly, and (often) brief as possible, which is what we do in reconstructing a novel’s argument. The reverse is also true. Given a text that is uncontroversially an explicit, orderly, and brief (...) argument, in order to enhance plausibility, our first instinct is to flesh it out with illustrations and relationships to everyday life. If this process is fictive (e.g., with “thought experiments”) and orderly, it is story-telling. This paper investigates whether there is a principled way of determining a novel’s argument, which should contribute as much to understanding arguments as to understanding novels. (shrink)